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Emerging Agricultural
Water Conservation Price Incentives
Ari M. Michelsen,  R. G. Taylor,
Ray G. Huffaker, and J. Thomas McGuckin
Recent Bureau of Reclamation  policies encourage or require irrigation districts to
adopt  price  conservation  incentives.  Using unpublished  survey results  and  new
district-level information, we examine the rate structures and incentives of district
water pricing.  Our findings reveal that the majority of districts use fixed charges
independent  of the  quantity of water delivered  and that most  conservation  rate
structures  recently  implemented  are  designed  so  that  the  first  tier  quantity
allocation  satisfies  most  crop  water needs.  Although  other district  management
objectives  may be  satisfied,  price  incentives  are diminished  or nonexistent.  The
question of whether conservation is being achieved is tautological  and depends on
how each district defines conservation.
Key words: conservation, irrigation districts, price incentives, rate structure, water
use policy
Introduction
Agriculture uses close to 90% of the water consumed in the western United States (U.S.
Congress,  Office of Technology Assessment).  Of the 46 million acres  of land irrigated
in 17 western states, almost 20% receives water from U.S. Department  of the Interior
(USDI), Bureau of Reclamation (BOR) water supply, storage, and distribution projects
(USDI 1996b). The BOR is the largest supplier and manager of water in the West.
BOR projects  annually divert more than 40 million acre-feet  (MAF) of water from
western rivers and supply 25.4 MAF of water to 9.2 million acres of land (USDI 1996b,
p. 3-2), an average of almost 2.8 acre-feet of water per acre. Although water supplies and
uses vary from year to year,  U.S.  Geological  Survey estimates from over the last 20
years indicate that land irrigated with BOR project water receives from one-quarter to
one-half acre-foot more water than the average delivery per acre of all irrigated land in
17 western states (USDI 1996b, p. 3-53). Municipal and industrial deliveries of 4.4 MAF,
representing  14% of total BOR deliveries  in 1991, helped to meet the needs of almost
30 million people (USDI 1996b, p. 3-1). Approximately one-quarter of total diversions
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(around  10 MAF) are  "lost" in operational  spills and conveyance  to agricultural and
municipal uses (Moore).
Following  almost  three-quarters  of  a  century  of  structural  water  development
projects,  the BOR  focus has turned from the construction  of new supply facilities to
management of existing water resources (USDI 1992). Management strategies adopted
by BOR in response to pressure from growing demands, increasing costs, legislation, and
litigation include conservation  measures  implemented at the irrigation district level,
modifications  in water supply contract terms, and changes in operating rules (Moore;
Wahl  and  Osterhoudt).  Stated  goals  of these  new  management  approaches  are  to
encourage  the  efficient  and  beneficial  use  of water,  protect  the  environment,  and
safeguard the investment in BOR facilities (USDI 1992). In particular, conservation by
irrigation districts has been mandated by Congress as a strategy to better manage and
extend  the  use  of existing  BOR  supplies  and  facilities  as well  as reduce  negative
environmental  impacts.
Under the Reclamation  Reform Act (RRA)  of 1982 and the Central Valley  Project
Improvement Act (CVPIA) of 1992, irrigation districts that receive BOR project water
are required to have conservation plans. In late 1996, almost  15 years after passage of
the RRA, the BOR adopted a new policy which encourages and, in some cases, requires
districts to incorporate conservation price incentives as part of their conservation plans.
Price incentive programs are promoted as a voluntary economic method to achieve water
conservation at the district level. However, relatively little is known about preexisting
irrigation district rate structures, the adoption and design of price incentive programs,
or district objectives of price incentive programs.
Our objectives are to identify and examine rate structures that have been adopted by
irrigation districts and analyze emerging irrigation district price programs in terms of
providing water conservation incentives and achieving BOR and district management
objectives.  We  use unpublished  survey results and new district-level  information to
examine  and  characterize  rate  structure  adoption  and  water  conservation  price
incentives. BOR conservation pricing objectives, policies, and requirements provide the
framework and criteria for our analysis.
Conservation Policies  and Compliance
In  1982,  Congress  enacted  the  Reclamation  Reform  Act  (P.L.  97-293)  to address  a
number of concerns about BOR water entitlements and pricing. After litigation stymied
several initial attempts in the 1980s to formalize regulations  implementing the RRA,
the BOR finally settled on regulations  calling for "a new water conservation program
to encourage  actively  and assist districts in the development  of high quality,  locally
tailored water conservation plans" (USDI 1996c, p. 15). The 1992 Central Valley Project
Improvement Act (P.L. 102-575) goes a step further by requiring conservation plans for
districts with new, amended, or interim water service contracts to include tiered pricing
or receive  an exemption.  Section  3405  (3,d)  of the act also institutes  water  pricing
reform between the BOR and Central Valley Project districts, requiring the specific use
of "inverted" (increasing) block rate pricing.
Irrigation districts have been slow to prepare conservation plans and reluctant to
adopt new price incentive rate structures. Repeated changes in regulations have led to
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confusion  about the objectives and requirements  of conservation  plans. Districts and
farmers also continue to express concerns about potential legal ramifications regarding
conserved water ownership and use, effects on water right entitlements, and district and
farm fiscal and economic impacts.
Irrigation district water  conservation  plans required  by the RRA  were originally
due by early 1987 (USDI 1996d, p.  3). By 1996,  under BOR's  1985 (and revised  1989)
conservation policy guidelines, less than half of 494 required districts had submitted a
conservation  plan  (USDI  1996b,  p.  3-26).  In the  four  states  receiving  the  largest
quantity of water from BOR projects (Idaho, California, Washington, and Arizona), 43%
of the districts had submitted conservation plans. In California by early 1996, approxi-
mately 28% of the required districts had submitted conservation  plans. By mid-1997,
approximately 50 out of 110 districts required to submit conservation plans under the
CVPIA had BOR-reviewed and approved plans (Slavin). Uncertainty about conservation
plan and price incentive requirements  continues to be an issue for irrigation district
managers  in preparing  plans  and for BOR staff in reviewing  and approving  plans.
Gradual implementation of conservation pricing is recommended for districts reluctant
to adopt price  incentives  because  of uncertainty  regarding  irrigator  acceptance  and
changes in water use, user cost, and district revenue (USDI 1997a).
The recommended  content and goals of water conservation  plans  are described  in
general  terms  in Reclamation Policy for Administering Water Conservation Plans
Pursuant  to Statutory and Contractual  Requirements  (USDI 1996d). Irrigation districts
are responsible for selecting their own water management conservation goals. According
to the BOR reclamation policy, "Water management and conservation efforts should be
a means  of  achieving  specific  goals  such as:  saving  money,  increasing  production,
reducing  soil  erosion,  eliminating  drainage  problems,  improving  water supply  and
delivery reliability, or freeing up water supplies for additional uses" (USDI 1996d, p. 6).
In our opinion, this menu provides a smorgasbord of broadly defined goals for districts
to choose  from, some of which may be inconsistent with the original intent of conser-
vation requirements or BOR-specified conservation pricing measures as shown later in
this article.
The  BOR defines  conservation  measures  as "those methods,  techniques,  policies,
practices,  procedures,  activities,  institutional  arrangements,  structural  projects,
physical facilities, equipment, or devices which reduce water consumption, reduce water
withdrawal  or diversion, reduce water loss or waste, improve water use efficiency,  or
increase water recycling or reuse" (USDI 1996d, p.  4). BOR recommends  four "funda-
mental"  measures  as  applicable  to  all  districts'  conservation  programs:  (a) water
measurement and accounting systems, (b) water pricing,  (c) information and education
programs, and (d) assignment of responsibility for conservation activities (USDI 1996d,
pp.  6-7).  Although  water  pricing  entails  aspects  of all four  elements,  pricing  is  a
separate  element "that encourages  efficiency  improvements  by water users"  (USDI
1996d, p. 7).
Rate structures are categorized  by BOR as either providing incentives  or disincen-
tives to efficiency improvements by water users. "To encourage efficient use, a pricing
and billing strategy is based, at least in part, on the quantity of water delivered" (USDI
1996d, p. 7). Examples provided of pricing disincentives to improvements in water use
are decreasing block rate structures and fixed charge (per acre) rates that are assessed
regardless  of the quantity  of water used.  Recognizing that the adoption  of quantity-
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based  pricing  may  be inconsistent  with  other  objectives  and  could  impact  district
revenue  and user cost, the BOR also states that "a conservation  pricing strategy does
not  necessarily  imply  that a district would  alter its overall  revenue  requirements,
increase  costs to users, or  eliminate  all present  methods  of recovering  certain fixed
costs" (USDI  1996d,  p.  7).  BOR has produced two guides-Achieving Efficient Water
Management:A Guidebook  for  PreparingAgricultural  Water Conservation  Plans"  (USDI
1996a) and Incentive Pricing  Handbook forAgricultural  Water Districts  (USDI 1997a)-
on  conservation  plan content  and  methods  to  develop  district-level  price  incentive
programs.
Although  the  Reclamation  Reform  Act requires  each  district to  develop  a water
conservation plan (RRA, 43 USC 390jj, §210b), it does not provide specific authority or
an enforcement mechanism that BOR can use with districts that do not comply.  The
policy  adopted  by  the  current  administration  is  to  assist  districts  in  preparing
conservation  plans,  with  the  hope  that  all  districts  will  submit  or  revise  their
conservation  plan within five  years  of adoption  of the December  1996  policy (USDI
1996d; Phillips). It is important to recognize that BOR will review, but does not approve,
district conservation plans under the RRA  (USDI  1996d,  p. 3). Therefore,  under the
RRA, the preparation of conservation plans and use of incentive pricing are essentially
voluntary.
Under the Central Valley Project Improvement Act, districts must submit a conser-
vation plan for BOR regional  office review and approval. Districts must include  some
form of conservation pricing as part of their conservation plan or receive an exemption
from  BOR  based  on  other  district-identified  water  management  objectives  or
constraints.  Without an approved plan, a district is subject to the 80-10-10 provision
[CVPIA,  §3405(a)3d]  which  increases  the  cost of the  water it receives.  Under  this
provision, the first 80%  of water  delivered  to the district by BOR is assessed at the
operation and maintenance rate, the last 10% is charged at the full cost rate, and the
middle  10%  is  charged  at a rate between  the operation/maintenance  and full  cost
amounts. 1 Districts also become subject to this pricing provision when they enter into
new or interim BOR service  contracts.  Given these conservation  pricing policies  and
requirements, what are the characteristics  of district rate structures? We address this
question in the section that follows.
Irrigation District Rate Structures
The institutional system under which prices are administered is key to understanding
the  design  of irrigation  district  rate  structures  and  adoption  of conservation  price
incentives. Irrigation districts enter into water supply service and repayment contracts
with the BOR. Water supply costs assessed by BOR are based on project construction,
operation, and maintenance costs. Opportunity costs are not considered in the allocation
or pricing of BOR water. Individual districts in turn establish rate structures for their
users to  satisfy  BOR contractual  costs and  district  costs  of operation  and  delivery.
Districts are not-for-profit intermediaries  between the BOR and irrigators. Therefore,
1 For further information  on repayment and full cost pricing, see  "1997 Irrigation Water Rates: Central Valley Project,
California"  (USDI 1997b) and "Bureau of Reclamation: Information on Allocation and Repayment of Costs of Constructing
Water Projects" (U.S. General Accounting  Office).
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it should not be surprising that district pricing of water reflects this arrangement such
that rate  structures  and  irrigator  payments  are  designed  to  cover just operation,
maintenance, and BOR contract costs.  Legal, institutional, and physical restrictions
limit the  ability  and  incentive  for  the  BOR,  irrigation  districts,  or  water  users to
consider other costs in water price structures. Because of these constraints and to avoid
conflict, the focus of the BOR conservation price incentive policy is based on "present
district-to-user pricing" (USDI 1996d, p. 8).
Despite an emphasis on price incentives  in conservation plans, there is an almost
total absence  of information  regarding historical  or current rate structures used by
irrigation districts. The BOR neither reports nor compiles data on irrigation district rate
structures. There is some evidence that prior to the RRA, few districts had implemented
pricing that would encourage conservation.  In the early 1980s, Mann reported that a
total of 13 of 61  irrigation districts chosen by the BOR as having water conservation
potential used some form of tiered or block rate pricing. However,  10 of these districts
employed a decreasing  block rate structure where the price of water delivered in the
second tier was less than the price of water in the first tier. Wichelns and Cone analyzed
the adoption of an increasing block rate structure designed to reduce the volume of drain
water in a single  district.  The purpose  of this price  structure was for water quality
rather than conservation.
The best and only comprehensive information on district rate structures was obtained
by  analyzing  the  responses  to  an unpublished  survey  of BOR  irrigation  districts
conducted jointly by the U.S. Department of Agriculture/Economic Research Service and
BOR (Negre,  Moore,  and McGuckin).2 Each irrigation district receiving BOR project
water was sent a survey on its 1986 rate structure (fixed cost assessment, block prices,
and water quantity allocations). The 196 valid survey responses account for more than
70% of total BOR district irrigated acreage.
Both typical and innovative irrigation district rate structures  can be characterized
from the results of the 1986 irrigation district survey. At that time, essentially prior to
conservation  pricing  adopted in response  to  RRA and  CVPIA regulations,  a typical
district (86% of the districts) assessed a fixed  service charge per acre that was inde-
pendent of the amount of water delivered (figure 1). Forty-eight percent of the districts
assessed only this fixed charge, and 38% assessed a fixed charge plus a quantity-based
(decreasing,  constant, or increasing) rate. In more than 80% of the districts with fixed
charge plus quantity-based rates, the variable or marginal price per unit of water was
uniform (constant). Of the total number of districts responding,  14% used a quantity-
based rate structure with no fixed charge,  and 96% of these had a constant per unit
water price. These results indicate that in 1986, half of the irrigation districts already
satisfied BOR's  definition of conservation rate structures where  pricing "is based, at
least in part, on the quantity of water delivered" (USDI 1996d, p. 7).
Implied  irrigation  district  water  prices  per  acre-foot  are  shown  by  type  of rate
structure in table 1.3 The difference between the implied average water price for farmers
2 Prior analysis of this survey had not been undertaken, in part, because  of difficulties in coding, compiling, and aggre-
gating the myriad of district rate structure survey responses.
3 When interpreting these implied prices, it is important to distinguish between allocation quantities and rate structures
reported by districts (yielding implied prices) and actual deliveries  and costs incurred by farmers.  Implied prices have the
potential to be misleading because they are calculated using rate structure  allocation quantities rather than quantities  of
water actually delivered. Complete rate and allocation  data were not available for all districts.
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Table 1.  Implied Average Water Price by Irrigation District Rate Structure
(1986  $/acre-foot)
Range
Type of Rate Structure  (n)a Average  Std. Dev.  Low  High
Fixed assessment only (64)  5.87  5.03  0.50  24.18
Fixed plus quantity pricing (42)  12.54  9.73  2.00  51.57
Quantity pricing only (23)  14.56  20.73  0.90  90.00
All rate structures  (165)  12.01  14.47  0.50  90.00
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Figure 1.  Irrigation district rate structure distribution (1986)
Quantity-Based  Pricing
(86%  use a uniform or decreasing  price)
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Table 2. Water Allocation  Quantity by Irrigation District Rate Structure
(acre-feet/acre)
Range
Type of Rate Structure (n)a  Average  Std. Dev.  Low  High
Fixed assessment only (63)  3.44  1.82  0.8  10.0
Fixed plus quantity pricing (44)  3.12  2.04  0.8  9.0
Quantity pricing only (21)  4.13  2.62  1.7  10.0
Quantity pricing only, < 10 AF (18)b  3.16  0.99  1.7  5.0
Note:  Calculations are based on 1986 irrigation district rate structure water quantity allocations.
aSample size.
b  Allocation quantity excluding those districts with  10 acre-feet per acre allocations.
in districts that used a fixed assessment only ($5.87/acre-foot) and the average price in
districts that used a fixed assessment plus quantity-based pricing ($12.54/acre-foot) or
only quantity-based pricing ($14.56/acre-foot)  was statistically significant at the 95%
confidence  level using  a test of sample  means with unknown  population  standard
deviation  (Hildebrand and Ott).  The  difference  between the average  water prices in
districts that used fixed assessment plus quantity-based pricing and the average price
in districts that used only quantity-based pricing was not statistically significant.
Water quantity allocations are shown by rate structure in table 2. The average quan-
tity of water allocated in districts with only fixed assessments was 3.44 acre-feet per
acre.  In  districts  with a fixed  assessment  plus  quantity-based  pricing, the  average
allocation was 3.12 acre-feet per acre, and in districts with quantity-based pricing only,
the average allocation was 4.13 acre-feet per acre. Excluding a small number of Arizona
districts with allocations of 10 acre-feet per acre, the average  allocation for quantity
pricing only rate structures  decreases almost one acre-foot to 3.16 acre-feet per acre.
Of particular interest is the finding that tere was no statistically significant difference
in the average  quantity  of water  allocated by the different types  of rate structures.
Analysis of the district survey responses indicates that the quantity of water allocated
in the first rate block was typically more than adequate to cover most irrigation appli-
cations for normal years.4 Increasing block price incentives would have limited impact
under these conditions.
One explanation for the lack of significant variation observed in rate structure quan-
tity allocations is that allocations  are often independently established based on legal
rights or contractual water duties set on the basis of crop requirements and assumed
application efficiency (independent of economic value). These allocation obligations need
to be fulfilled regardless of the type of rate structure. Although the 1986 survey data are
the  most comprehensive  available,  the extent to which  actual deliveries  differ from
irrigation  district  rate structure  allocations,  as well  as the  adoption and  design  of
conservation price incentive rate structures, is unknown.
4 Our conservation  pricing survey update and case studies of recent conservation price incentive programs suggest that
little has  changed  in rate structure  quantity  allocation  since  the  1986  survey,  and that the  first block water quantity
allocation is commonly set by districts to cover most crop water needs. This is also consistent with the rate structure findings
of Willey and Diamant for a sample of Washington State irrigation districts.
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Updates of Conservation Price Incentives
The 1986 survey was updated with information from districts that have adopted and/or
were identified as the best examples of conservation price incentive programs by BOR
staff and other water managers  (Slavin; Christopherson;  Phillips; Powers;  Davidoff;
Townsend) and from recent studies (Wichelns and Cone; Pequod Associates, Inc.). Staff
at each of the BOR regional offices were contacted and asked to identify districts that
had significantly changed their rate structures or adopted any types of conservation-
oriented pricing structure in the last 10 years. Most reported that none or few districts
in their  region had  significantly  changed  price  structures  or  adopted  conservation
pricing.  Those districts identified by BOR staff as having changed rate structures  or
adopted conservation pricing were then contacted,  and information  was compiled  on
their  1997  rate  structures,  prices,  typical  water deliveries,  special  conditions,  and
primary conservation program/water management objectives. Although price levels for
some districts had increased in response to increases in delivery costs, we found only a
small number of irrigation districts that had significantly changed their rate structure
or had adopted conservation pricing since the 1986 survey.5 The  1986 survey remains
the only comprehensive  source of rate structure information.  However,  results of the
updated sample, summarized in table 3, provide useful information in characterizing
the adoption, design, and objectives of recent conservation-oriented  rate structures.
Conservation  Pricing  and Cost Recovery Objectives
The districts identified in table 3 were classified as having a conservation-oriented rate
structure  in  1997  because  the  cost of water  was  based, to varying  degrees,  on  the
quantity of water delivered  to the irrigator, and the marginal cost of water either was
constant (uniform) or increasing (USDI 1996d, p. 7). Although classified as conservation-
oriented pricing under the BOR definition, objectives other than conservation  appear
to determine the design and incentives of these rate structures. We found the majority
of these districts continue to have a fixed charge in their rate structure, and in many
cases the fixed charge is a substantial portion of total water cost. For example, the fixed
charge is approximately one-third or more of the total water cost in the rate structures
used by the Arvin-Edison, Broadview, and Firebaugh Canal irrigation districts. In some
districts, such as Grand Valley, Frenchman-Cambridge, and Twin Loop, the fixed charge
covers almost all of the total water cost. The primary rate design objective for most of
these  districts  was related  to  district  cost  recovery  or  contractual  and  regulatory
requirements.
Although  not  conservation  oriented,  fixed  charges  have  attributes  desirable  in
meeting  other  district  objectives.  A  fixed  charge  provides  revenue  (cost  recovery)
stability regardless of variations in supply and use, requires no quantity measurement
or accounting record  for assessing  cost, and is  simple to calculate  and understand,
thus incorporating several of the conditions of a desirable rate structure as identified
by Bonbright, Danielsen, and Kamerschen. For example, the beginning of the 1998 crop
5 Some of the districts identified had changed prices in response to changes in their BOR supply contracts. These were not
classified as districts adopting conservation pricing.
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Table 3.  1997 Illustrative Sample of Irrigation Districts Employing Conser-
vation Price Incentive Programs
Water Quantity
Rate Type / Marginal
Cost Classification
No.  Average  Block
1986  1997  of  Delivered  Allocated
Irrigation District  State  Survey  Update  Tiers  AF/Acre  Acre-Feet
Arvin-Edison  CA  Uniform  Uniform  1  2.70  2.70
Broadview  CA  Uniform  Increasing  2  2.07  2.60
Central CA (CCID)  CA  Uniform  Increasing  2  3.22  3.00
Firebaugh Canalb  CA  Fixed  Increasing  4  2.50  1.00
Irvine Ranchc  CA  Uniform  Increasing  4  Crop  Crop
Panoche  CA  Uniform  Increasing  2  2.00  2.40
Deloresd'e  CO  Increasing  Increasing  2  1.96  1.96
Grand Valley  CO  Increasing  Increasing  2  5.30  4.00
Uncompahgre  CO  Increasing  Increasing  2  4.00  4.00
Buffalo Rapids  MT  Increasing  Increasing  2  2.50  2.50
Glasgow f MT  Uniform  Uniform  1  2.00  3.00
Greenfields  MT  Fixed  Increasing  2  2.10  2.00
Farwell  NE  Increasing  Increasing  2  1.50  1.00
Frenchman-Cambridge  NE  Increasing  Increasing  2  1.15  1.00
Twin Loopd  NE  Increasing  Increasing  2  1.00  1.50
Casper-Alcova  WY  Increasing  Increasing  2  2.50  2.00
Note:  Table displays 1997 rate structures, prices, and quantity allocations.
aArvin-Edison:  Fixed cost sum of general administration $23.14/acre, plus $71/acre  standby cost; variable
of $41 plus $9 per lift, average $65/AF;  tiered rate has not been implemented.
b Firebaugh: Third tier is 2-3 AF at $21/AF; fourth tier is >  3 AF at $23/AF.
cIrvine Ranch: Uniform rate billed monthly; year-end assessment by crop to determine allocation; penalty
surcharges for use above allocation; not a BOR district.
dDelores and Twin Loop: Initial rate structure classifications  apply to 1987 when the districts began oper-
ations.
eDelores: 1997 is first year of full project acreage; previously first block water was available up to 26 inches/
acre; entire project is pressurized delivery; variable cost is largely pumping cost.
fGlasgow: First block allocation is not limited; 3.00 AF used only for illustration.
g  Casper-Alcova:  Fixed charge of $150 for the first AF on total irrigated acreage; uniform marginal cost per
AF up to 2 AF for first block allocation.
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Table 3.  Extended
Marginal Price
First  Next
Fixed  Block  Block
Charge  Price  Price
($/acre)  ($/AF)  ($/AF)  District-Defined  Conservation Objective(s)
94.14a 65.00  65.00  Ground water management
77.00  47.14  77.14  Reduce drainage water (allocation by crop)
0.00  7.00  20.00  Encourage  efficient management, protect rights
22.00  14.00  16.00  Reduce drainage water, increase efficiency
0.00  241.00  265.00  Efficient use (allocation by crop), penalty
0.00  50.00  100.00  Reduce drainage water
0.00  26.35  110%-160%  Encourage efficient management, penalty
14.30  0.00  4.95  Contract requirement
19.75  0.00  4.94  Penalize overuse of water
25.00  0.00  7.70  Cost recovery (pumping)
18.01  3.00  3.00  Cost recovery,  delivery capacity constraint
16.66  0.00  8.33  Increase carryover  storage
26.00  0.00  17.00  Manage excess ground water
29.50  0.00  21.00  Cost recovery (BOR purchase cost)
26.40  0.00  21.00  Reduce waste, reduce  runoff, water management
g  11.00  20.00  Increase storage carryover
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season  in California  was  wet and  cool,  so  farmers had little  need to irrigate.  This
resulted in revenue and repayment problems for districts with per unit pricing instead
of fixed charge pricing (Cone). It is reasonable to expect that districts with an interest
in conservation, but concerned about these issues and irrigator acceptance or response
to variable  water rates,  may therefore  choose  to  have  a  fixed  charge  in their rate
structure.
Tier Allocations and Conservation  Objectives
Water allocation  quantities  are critical in providing conservation incentive.  In most
cases, the rate structures that have been adopted are designed so that the quantity of
water delivered at the first tier price is sufficient to meet most typical grower water
needs. That is, the price incentive to conserve starts near or above the typical quantity
of water applied. This characteristic can be seen in table 3 by comparing the first block
allocations and typical delivery quantities. For example, the volume allowed at the first
block price for the Broadview irrigation district was 2.6 acre-feet per acre for cotton and
tomatoes, while the average delivery was 2.3 acre-feet for these crops and 2.07 acre-feet
for all crops from 1992 through 1995 (Cone). First block allocation quantities also exceed
average  use levels for the Panoche,  Glasgow, and Twin Loop irrigation districts, and
first block  allocations for Arvin-Edison,  Delores,  Uncompahgre,  and Buffalo  Rapids
irrigation districts are the same as typical water deliveries.
Another characteristic  noted in both the 1986 survey and the 1997 update sample is
that most of the tiered rate structures use only two blocks (table 3). The exceptions in
this group are the Firebaugh Canal Water District (four tiers) and Irvine Ranch Water
District (four "penalty" tiers). Even with these multiple tiers, the initial block allocations
cover most deliveries.  For example, agricultural  users have never exceeded the first
block allocation of the four-tier Irvine Ranch Water District rate structure (Ash), and
the first two tiers of the Firebaugh Canal Water District cover deliveries up to two acre-
feet with average deliveries of 2.5 acre-feet (Bryant). Legal or contractual obligations
and the desire not to restrict "beneficial" uses of water were the most frequently cited
objectives in setting tier quantities at or near typical use levels.
A few districts vary the quantity of water allocated within a tier depending on the
type of crop grown. For example, the first block allocation for farmers in the Broadview
irrigation district is 2.6 acre-feet per acre if cotton or tomatoes are grown, and 1.7 acre-
feet per acre if melons are grown (Cone). Crop-based tier quantities are designed to not
penalize farmers for growing water-intensive crops by adjusting the block quantity to
satisfy specific crop water needs. At the same time, the tiers are set to reduce "wasteful"
water use as  determined  by  the  district.  This  type of rate  structure  assumes  that
different quantities of water used reasonably should be provided at the same cost to all
irrigators within the district. Although it is not economically  efficient in the sense of
equating the opportunity costs of water supply internal or external to the district, the
rate structure does encourage increased application and hydrologic efficiency, and there-
fore may achieve other district objectives such as reducing return flows where drainage
is a problem.
Within-season block allocations also have been implemented to satisfy drainage flow
objectives and manage variation in supply sources (e.g., direct flow rights) and limita-
tions in facility capacity (storage reservoirs and canals). Since they are a form of tiered
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quantity-based  rate  structures,  they  were  classified  as  conservation  pricing.  The
Panoche  and  Broadview  irrigation  districts  in  California  use  two  within-season
increasing block rate structures in efforts to reduce return flow drainage water. The tier
allocations were established based on typical historical water deliveries considered by
the district to be reasonable. During the pre-irrigation season, the first block quantity
in both districts covers water deliveries up to 0.75 acre-feet per acre.6 Use above this
amount is charged a significantly higher "penalty" rate-an additional $50 and $30 per
acre-foot for Panoche and Broadview, respectively (table 3). A second set of rates applies
to  the  entire  growing  season,  including  pre-irrigation  deliveries.  Several  district
managers (e.g., Hedrick;  Cone) reported that these rate structures have been effective
in reducing delivery quantities by making irrigators more aware of their water use and
by discouraging  water use above established  levels,  in part,  through peer pressure.
However, these anecdotal reports of changes in water use have not been adjusted for
variation in other factors such as temperature, hydrologic conditions, cropping patterns,
or  implementation  of  other  conservation  measures,  and  have  not  been  otherwise
statistically validated.
Price  Incentives and District  Objectives
The amount of the price  incentive varied depending on district objectives  and oppor-
tunities for economic  gain in reallocating  conserved water.  Districts with objectives
associated with increasing opportunity costs (reallocation to higher value use, increased
pumping costs, drainage  or delivery restrictions,  etc.) had clear economic  reasons to
adopt conservation pricing incentives.  When cost recovery was the primary objective,
districts had little incentive to adopt conservation pricing, especially if it might result
in unstable, insufficient, or excess revenue.
Consistent with responses from the 1986 survey, many of the districts in the updated
sample identified by BOR staff and district managers as having conservation incentive
pricing had tier pricing that by itself, or when combined with tier allocation quantities,
would result in negligible  or small increases in total water cost. For example, in the
Uncompahgre Water Users District, the price for water used above the first block was
set at the average cost of the first block, $4.94 per acre-foot.  But with typical deliveries
of four acre-feet per acre, the average total cost of water was $19.75 per acre, the same
as the  first block  price  (table  3). The  primary  objective  was to  generate  sufficient
revenue for cost recovery. With a primary objective of controlling and reducing drainage
water,  the Firebaugh  Canal Water District implemented  a four-tier increasing rate
structure. The first tier covered up to one acre-foot at $14 per acre-foot; the last tier was
$23 per acre-foot for deliveries above three acre-feet (Bryant). With typical deliveries
around 2.5 acre-feet,  the total water cost, including the $22 per acre fixed charge, was
$62.50 per acre, or an average of $25 per acre-foot. If the per unit price remained at the
first block rate of $14 per acre-foot, the total cost would have been $57,  or $22.80 per
acre-foot.
Uniform quantity-based  rates, classified  as conservation oriented,  also have been
adopted to meet other district objectives. The Arvin-Edison Water Storage District uses
6 Broadview reduced the pre-irrigation season first tier water quantity to 8 inches per acre in 1998 (Cone).
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a uniform rate of $65 per acre-foot of surface water.  The rate was established for cost
recovery and held constant for rate stability, but is also intended to encourage the use
of surface water during normal water supply years.7 Ground water management is the
conservation objective here. During a future drought, the district plans to implement an
increasing  block rate structure to encourage  irrigators  to pump  ground water when
surface supplies are low. A recent agreement with the Metropolitan Water District to
recharge and exchange up to 250,000 acre-feet of ground water over the next 25 years
provides additional economic incentive for Arvin-Edison (Lewis). The Glasgow Irrigation
District uses a uniform price of $3 per acre-foot as incentive in allocating limited system
delivery capacity.
The Central California Irrigation District (CCID) is one of a relatively small number
of districts that has a quantity-based rate structure without fixed costs. CCID went
from uniform pricing/$6 per acre-foot in 1986, to increasing tier pricing in 1989. During
the 1997 growing season, the first block (up to three acre-feet) was $7 per acre-foot, and
the  second  block  (more than  three  acre-feet)  was  $20  per  acre-foot  (table  3).8 The
relatively large increase in price was established as a penalty to discourage  wasteful
water use (Porter). Water deliveries  in the district vary widely by crop, from less than
one acre-foot per acre for barley and radishes to 14 acre-feet for basil, with deliveries for
cotton and alfalfa,  the two largest crops, averaging  3.55 and 3.91  acre-feet per acre,
respectively, in 1996 (CCID). Districtwide water deliveries averaged 3.22 acre-feet per
acre for a total cost of $25.40 per acre in 1997 (Porter). The district reports that water
has been conserved in terms of reduced deliveries, and the new rates generate surplus
revenues which are used in a revolving fund for individual irrigator water conservation
efforts.  Financial  success  of the  program  may  be  attributed  to  the  opportunities
available for water use and economic gain. Conserved water is available for irrigation
within the district, and 15,000-20,000  acre-feet per year have been sold at $40-$50 per
acre-foot (more than twice the highest block rate) and transferred for use outside the
district.
Many of the conservation price incentives in the updated sample were designed to
provide a "reasonable" quantity of water at rates that cover district costs, and to pen-
alize irrigators only for unreasonably high quantities of water use. The term "penalty"
was frequently used by districts in describing the purpose of increasing block rates. The
concept  is that only those  irrigators using water "wastefully,"  as defined  by an indi-
vidual district, are penalized. For example, the Irvine Ranch Water District establishes
its reasonable  water allocation  quantity by crop,  varying the allocation  each season
based on previous water use, current season daily evapotranspiration,  and application
efficiency of 80%. Blocks above the reasonable level of use are given names which convey
the wasteful message: a "penalty" rate applies to the first 10% of water used above the
allocated reasonable  amount, followed by an "excessive" rate for the next 10%, and an
"abusive" rate for additional water use. All deliveries have fallen within the first block;
that is, farmers have not exceeded their base allocation to incur penalty rates.
7 District staff estimate the full (capital, depreciation,  operation, and maintenance)  cost of ground water pumping to be
greater than $65 per acre-foot (Arvin-Edison Water Storage District).
8 A six-tier rate structure was implemented by CCID in 1998 to provide  additional price incentives to reduce excessive
water use. It is estimated that the new rate structure will have a small impact on average  users, increasing total cost by
about $1 (Porter)..
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BOR  conservation  policy recommends  a water pricing structure  "that encourages
efficiency improvements  by water users" (USDI 1996d,  p. 7). At the same time, BOR
policy leaves it up to districts to define their own conservation objectives. Districts have
responded by designing rate structures to accomplish a variety of hydrologic, financial,
environmental,  legal,  and  political  management  objectives  under  the  name  of
conservation pricing. These rate structures may be achieving the desired "conservation"
effects as they have been defined by individual districts.
Water Conservation Is a
Catchword/Symbol
"Conservation is a catchword and symbol of national water policy" (Weatherford, p. 3).
Defining water conservation is not a didactic exercise, but rather determines implemen-
tation of conservation policy and practices and subsequent outcomes. Mann categorizes
conservation definitions  as follows:
* Beneficial Use. Water, like other resources, should be developed and used for the
benefits it brings to society. Water that is not used is wasted.
* Preserve and Protect. Preserve  and protect  water for  aesthetic  and environ-
mental values.
* Hydrologic Efficiency.  Maximize  output  from water  use  and thus  eliminate
evaporation,  transpiration, and ocean returns.
* Economic Efficiency. Water is neither a free good nor a priceless commodity, but
rather a resource that may be developed or conserved on the basis of the benefits
and costs to society (pp. 12-13).
The BOR remains  silent  on water conservation  objectives  (USDI  1996b),  leaving
irrigation districts and others to define and debate the meaning, and consequently the
measures of effectiveness,  of conservation programs.  The result is that under current
BOR policy, the question of whether conservation is being achieved is tautological.  It
depends on how conservation is defined-and irrigation districts have been placed in the
position of individually defining the meaning of conservation.  For many of the reasons
discussed  above,  some  irrigation  districts  appear  to  slant  conservation  policy  and
practices,  including rate  structure incentives,  toward  beneficial  use and hydrologic
efficiency.  The net effect may not match the policy maker's initial conservation objec-
tives as demonstrated by Huffaker and Whittlesey, and by Huffaker et al.
Noticeably absent in most irrigation districts' water pricing programs  is the use of
market water  prices  to  signal  opportunity  costs  and  allocate  resources  efficiently.
Contractual  obligations  between  BOR and  irrigation  districts,  combined  with legal
restrictions  on water transfers, often limit the ability of districts and farmers to fully
reflect opportunity costs in water use and pricing. Weatherford's strategy of "conserve-
and-transfer" to achieve the highest and best use for water in society cannot be accomp-
lished without conservation in terms of decreased consumptive use. District measures
of conservation change the form, place,  and time of water use in a basin or watershed,
but consumptive water use may increase and the quantity of water available for other
uses may remain the same or even decrease (Huffaker et al.).
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Summary and Conclusions
Recent BOR policies  and regulations encourage or require irrigation districts to adopt
conservation price incentives. Unpublished survey results and new district-level infor-
mation were used to examine and characterize  historical and emerging rate structure
adoption and water conservation price incentives. We found the overwhelming majority
of districts had adopted rate structures with a fixed charge that did not vary with the
quantity  of water  delivered.  The rate structures  used by  approximately  half  of all
districts in 1986 had some form of constant or increasing quantity-based rate structure,
and already met BOR's  1996 definition of conservation pricing.  We determined,  how-
ever, that the actual design of many of these rate structures was unlikely to result in
major changes  in water use. The quantity  of water allocated  by districts  with fixed
charge and quantity-based  rate structures  was the same. Where price incentive rate
structures  have  been  adopted,  the  common  practice  has  been  to  set the  first  tier
quantity so that it satisfies typical deliveries and most crop application needs. Conser-
vation  price incentives  were minimal  or nonexistent as long as water use remained
within these reasonable use allocations. Water use above typical amounts was generally
considered wasteful (excessive) by water managers, and rate increases were applied as
penalties and for internal district cost recovery. Reports of conservation price incentive
effectiveness  were anecdotal, without adjustments for variation in other factors such as
temperature,  hydrologic  conditions,  cropping  patterns,  or  implementation  of  other
conservation measures, and were not otherwise statistically validated.
While requiring conservation plans and incentive pricing, the BOR remains silent on
the  purpose  of  conservation,  leaving  irrigation  districts  and  others  to  define  the
objectives of conservation and measures of effectiveness. Under this policy, the question
of whether conservation is being achieved by price or other measures is tautological; it
simply depends on how conservation is defined by an individual district. Districts are
typically interested  in conservation  as beneficial  use or hydrologic  efficiency,  where
water not used is wasted.  This will continue to be the case as long as BOR and state
institutions  limit  water  management  opportunities  to the  economic  costs  that are
internal to each district.
An economic alternative  for establishing  effective and efficient pricing would be to
implement  policies  that allow  water  management  objectives  to be  associated  with
appropriate opportunity costs. For example, to achieve efficient levels of conservation
for internal and external district use, BOR and district water allocations  and prices
could be established at the opportunity cost of external use.  If the goal is to manage
drainage water, rate structures for delivered water could be established at the marginal
drainage  cost  times  irrigation  efficiency.  Pricing  is  not  a  panacea.  Pricing  water
deliveries or return flows may result in greater consumptive water use. In evaluating
the adoption,  design,  and  effectiveness  of conservation  pricing rate structures,  it is
important to recognize that current legal, contractual, and institutional arrangements
severely constrain both the BOR and districts from implementing pricing that reflects
other water management objectives and opportunity costs.
[Received August 1997;  final revision received  December 1998.]
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